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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)G), because this is an appeal from a final district court judgment that was 
transferred from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The district court appropriately exercised its discretion by awarding prejudgment 
interest of 2.27% per annum simple interest pursuant to Utah Code § 15-1-4. 
This appeal raises three issues: 
1. Did the district court err when adhering to the Utah Supreme Court's decision 
in Wilcox by refusing to apply the contractual prejudgment interest rate set by 
Utah Code § 15-1-1 (2) to damages awarded by a jury only for tort claims? 
(Section I) 
2. If the parties did not stipulate to a prejudgment interest rate, did the district 
court exceed its discretion by applying Utah's post-judgment interest rate in 
this case after reviewing briefs describing controlling and persuasive Utah case 
law making that very choice? (Section LC.) 
3. Did the parties stipulate to a prejudgment interest rate, and if so, did the district 
court exceed its discretion by refusing to be bound by their mutual mistake of 
law regarding the applicable prejudgment interest rate? (Section II.) 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following versions of Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 are implicated in this appeal. 
First, the version of Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 in effect at the time of the underlying events 
of this matter, which is the same as the present statute and reads as follows: 
( 1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan 
or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of 
their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal 
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in 
action shall be 10% per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any penalty or 
interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any 
contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981. 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (2015) ( enacted 1989). 
Second, the immediately previous version of the § 15-1-1, which read as follows: 
( 1) Except when the parties to a lawful contract agree on a specified rate of 
interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, 
goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum. Nothing in this section may 
be constmed to in any way affect any penalty or interest charge which by law 
applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made 
before May 14, 1981. 
(2) The pa1iies to a lawful contract may agree upon rate of interest for the loan or 
forbearance of money, goods, or chose in action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (2) ( 1985). 
Third, the version of§ 15-1-1 prior to that, which read as follows: 
The legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance money, goods or things in 
action shall be 10% per annum. But nothing herein contained shall be so constmed 





delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made before the 14th day 
of May, 1981. 
Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1 (1981). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal concerns the rate of prejudgment interest applicable to non-contract 
claims. As part of crafting proposed jury instructions and a special verdict fonn designed 
to assist the jury, the parties and the district court withdrew a proposed stipulated jury 
instruction (No. 29) before presenting it to the jury and reserved to the court calculations 
concerning prejudgment interest. After the jury decided that the Fullers failed to prove 
their contract claims, the district court addressed the question of prejudgment interest and 
the Fullers sought a prejudgment interest rate of I 0% as provided by § 15-1-1 for contract 
actions. After deciding that the parties had not stipulated to an interest rate, the district 
court detennined that § 15-1-1 did not apply to the claims of breach of agency duties or 
negligent misrepresentation. The court appropriately exercised its discretion in following 
persuasive Utah case law and applied Utah's post-judgment interest rate of 2.27% as 
provided by § 15-1-4. 
The district court correctly concluded that § 15-1-1 does not apply in this matter. In 
addition, even if the parties had somehow stipulated to the prejudgment interest rate set 
by § 15-1-1 in a proposed jury instruction that was not presented to the jury, the district 
court was required to disregard that instruction in order to avoid committing legal error. 
In the alternative, any such agreement was based on a mutual mistake, which would 
require the district court to refonn accordingly, and any error was invited by the Fullers. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Plaintiff-appellants David Fuller, Ruth M. Fuller, and Fuller Appliance LLC 
(hereafter, "The Fullers") sought compensation for damages allegedly suffered due to 
failure of defendant-appellees Denise Bohne and Western States Insurance Agency, Inc. 
(hereafter, "Western States") to properly obtain business property insurance coverage on 
the Fullers' behalf. On February 3, 2007, the Fullers' suffered a fire at their home, which 
was also the location of Fullers' Appliance business. After receiving a check for $3,000 
from the insurance coverage in place, the Fullers sued Western States. (R.l, 1230, 1864). 
The Honorable Deno Himonas presided over a jury trial from October 27-30, 
20 I 4. R. I 969. After the trial, the jury found that Western States was not liable for breach 
of contract or promissory estoppel. The jury returned a verdict finding Western States 
liable for negligent misrepresentation and breach of agency duties (attributing 60% 
comparative fault to Western States). R. 1733-34. The Fullers were found 40% liable for 
the breach of agency duties and were awarded a total of$ IO I ,595 for property damages, 
and $0 for rent damages. Id. 
Prior to the jury verdict, the parties and the district court engaged in lengthy 
discussions in crafting proposed jury instructions and a Special Verdict form to assist the 
jury. R.1973:1-3, 68-74. For example, the court declined to include separate lines on the 
verdict fonn related to elements for each cause of action alleged by the Fullers. R.1973: 1-
3; I 2-17. Before the closing instructions were submitted to the jury, Western States 
requested and the court agreed that the district court calculate prejudgment interest, in 







already inquired about and discussed with both parties that a potential award of property 
damage would be subject to prejudgment interest, while a potential rent damages award 
would not. R.1973:68-69. 
The district court itself was the first to suggest that Instruction No. 29, crafted to 
guide the jury about a prejudgment interest claim, be entirely withdrawn. R.1973 :71. The 
pa1iies and the district court ultimately agreed to remove the interest iine from the Special 
Verdict form and to withdraw Jury Instruction No. 29 regarding a potential award on a 
prejudgment interest claim - hence, the jury was never presented with a claim for 
prejudgment interest. R.1973 :73. 
Questions about prejudgment interest resurfaced after the Fullers' Motion for 
Entry of Judgment, which included a request for 10% interest accruing from February 3, 
2007. R.1742-47. Western States opposed that interest rate, based on the plain language 
of the statute and controlling case law. R.17 59-67. Western States also opposed the date 
proffered by the Fullers for accrual of interest. Id. The Fullers never suggested that an 
accrual date was ever stipulated. See, e.g., R.1742-47, 1772-81. Based on Western States' 
objection, the court reserved its decision on prejudgment interest until receiving 
supplemental briefing on the issue. R.1795-96. The district court also heard argument on 
the Motion on January 29, 2015. R.1934, 1973. 
The district comi stated that it reviewed the record of the discussions several times 
to determine if an interest rate had been stipulated. See, e.g., R: 1973:3,6. Based on the 
record and supplemental briefing addressing the statute and case law, the district court 
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concluded that while Western States had stipulated that interest would be applied to any 
property damage award, the rate had not been stipulated by the parties and the rate set by 
§ 15-1-1 did not apply to the claims awarded by the jury ( as the contractual claims were 
not proven). Id. 
Ultimately, the district court exercised its appropriate discretion, followed the 
example of controlling and persuasive Utah cases, and awarded the Fullers prejudgment 
interest calculated at the post-judgment statutory rate in effect on the date of its decision, 
January 1, 2015 (2.27% per annum) on $101,595.00. R.1973:20-21. The district court 
decided that interest would accrue from June 13, 2007 through the date of entry of the 
judgment. R.1973:19. This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This appeal should be dismissed on the basis that: (I.) the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in deciding that Utah Code § 15-1-1 did not establish a legally binding 
prejudgment interest rate in this case; and (II.) the parties did not appropriately stipulate 
to a particular prejudgment interest rate. 
As analyzed further herein, the district comi had a reasonable basis to conclude 
that § 15-1-1 was not controlling for claims sounding in tort and con-ectly recognized 
that Utah Supreme Court precedent established in Wilcox v. Anchor Wate, 2007 UT 39, 
ljf45, 164 P. 3d limited such application to a subset of contract claims. 
Despite their creative arguments to the contrary, the parties verbal stipulation to 
withdraw proposed Jury Instruction No. 29 was not controlling upon the applicable 
6 
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prejudgment interest rate. Rather, the parties reserved to the court various 
determinations concerning prejudgment interest ( date of accrual and applicable rate) and 
the court appropriately concluded that it was empowered to make such calculations 
following the jury's verdict. 
Therefore, this Court should affirm as an appropriate exercise of discretion, the 
district court's application of a prejudgment interest rate of 2.27% commencing from 
June 13, 2007, through the date of entry of judgment on February 24, 2015. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BECAUSE 
IT HAD A REASONABLE BASIS FOR DECIDING THAT §15-1-1 DID 
NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
In deciding that Utah Code § 15-1-1 did not definitively establish the prejudgment 
interest rate for this case, the district court properly relied upon the language of§ 15-1-1 
itself along with both controlling and persuasive case law. Standing alone, each of these 
factors provides a reasonable basis for the district court's discretionary application of the 
interest rate set by Utah Code § 15-1-4. Its decision should therefore be affirmed. 
A. The District Court Correctly Recognized that the Utah Supreme Court 
Limited §15-1-1 to a Subset of Contract Claims in Wilcox, the Court of 
Appeals Has Followed Wilcox, and §15-1-1 Does Not Apply to this 
Case. 
Since the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Wilcox v. Anchor Wate, 164 
P.3d 353, 2007 UT 39, controlling Utah case law reflects that the current language of 
§ 15-1-1 does not apply to this case. 
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1. The Supreme Court Limited§ 15-1-1 to a Subset of Contract Claims in 
Wilcox, and Therefore fl 5-1-1 Does Not Set the Interest Rate in this Case. 
Utah Supreme Court precedent precludes the use of the interest rate in U.C.A. 
§ 15-1-1 in this matter. In deciding that § 15-1-1 "was meant to apply only to loans or 
forbearances in contract actions" the Utah Supreme court has clearly distinguished the 
use of the interest rate found in § 15-1-1 from this matter. Wilcox v. Anchor Wate, 2007 
UT 39, ,I45, 164 P.3d 353, quoting Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State 
Lands & ForeshJ', 886 P .2d 514, 525 n.13 (Utah 1994 ). 1 Since the prejudgment interest 
rate question posed by the Fullers has already been decided, Western States respectfully 
submits that this Court must adhere to the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in Wilcox. 
Justice Zimmennan first explained the proper reading of the current language of 
§ 15-1-1 in dicta in Consolidation Coal: 
"The author of this opinion has serious reservations about the initial correctness 
and therefore the continued vitality of. . .[any] case that purports to tie 
prejudgment interest rates in all contract cases to the section 15-1-1 rate in effect 
at the time the contract was signed .... [l]t provides a default interest rate when the 
parties have failed to specify an interest rate for 'the loan or forbearance of any 
money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of their contract."' 
Justice Zimmerman not only read the plain meaning of§ 15-1-1 as restricting its 
application to contract actions, he appropriately limited its application to a subset of 
1 Please note that Justice Zimmerman correctly read§ 15-1-1 's limitation to a "chose in 
action that is the subject of a contract," rather than encompassing any chose in action. 
Plaintiffs' prior arguments that § 15-1-1 applies to any chose in action are not reflected in 
the plain language of 1§5-1-1, as Justice Zimmerman's explanation clarifies and Wilcox 
expands upon. Rather, § 15-1-1 relates only to a chose in action which is the subject of a 
contract. Therefore, as the present case does not relate to a loan or forebearance of any 
money, goods, or chose in action which is the subject of a contract between the Fullers 
and Defendants, § 15-1-1 is inapposite. 
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contracts: those involving a "loan or forbearance of money, goods, or a chose in action 
that is the subject of their contract." This statute does not-cannot- encompass any and 
all contracts, let alone all choses in action. 2 
The Fullers attempt to elide any mere "chose in action" with a "chose in action 
which is the subject of a contract." The two, however, are markedly different. A chose in 
action is "a claim or debt upon which a recovery may be made in a lawsuit. It is not a 
present possession, but merely a right to sue."' Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. 
Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 1999 UT 49, ~9 quoting Barron's Law Dictionary 71 (3d ed.1991) 
( emphasis added). But § 15-1-1 does not address each and every contract, nor any chose 
in action at all (whether a statutory claim as in Wilcox or a common law claim as in this 
case). It only governs contracts addressing a loan, forebearance, or chose in action. An 
example of a "chose in action which is the subject of a contract" is provided by Time 
Finance Corp. v. Johnson Trucking Co., 458 P.2d 873 (Utah 1969). (reviewing the 
contractual assignment of a chose in action from one party to another). Time Finance 
addressed the destruction of insured property. "[T]he right to the [insurance] proceeds 
was a chose in action, which could be assigned as any other chose in action .... " Id., at 
876 (emphasis added). The subject of the contract was the legal claim itself, rather than 
existing proceeds-the contract addressed who could pursue the potential recovery of 
2 This proffered reading by the Fullers swallows most of the text of§ 15-1-1 ( 1) and (2) in 
one gulp, rendering those tenns meaningless. Utah courts "are compelled to give the 
statutory language meaning and to assume that each term in the statute was used 
advisedly." Andreason v. Felsted, 137 P.3d 1, 2006 UT App 188, ~11, citing Labelle v. 
McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 2004 UT 15, ~ 16, 89 P.3d 113. "Thus, we construe statutory 
enactments in a way that 'render[ s] all parts thereof relevant and meaningful."' Id. 
9 
proceeds.3 
Snow not only addressed a chose in action; it held that "a legal malpractice claim, 
like any other chose in action, may ordinarily be acquired by a creditor through 
attachment and execution." Snow, at ,I9. Moreover, Snow noted that a chose in action, as 
a claim of negotiable value even before adjudication, was at that time subject to 
execution under then-U.R.C.P. 69 (since repealed).4 
Snow and Time Finance show that a chose in action is an interest that is 
transferrable by contract. Such contracts are specifically addressed by § 15-1-1. Choses in 
action that are not the subject of a contract are not. 
Wilcox exemplifies this distinction. Wilcox's unanimous Supreme Court opinion 
not only confinned Justice Zimmennan's view that the scope of §15-1-1 is limited; it 
drew that limit even tighter. "Just as the default rate specified in section § 15-1-1 (2) does 
not automatically extend to all judgments obtained in contract cases, it does not 
automatically apply to all judgments based on statute where the legislature has failed to 
specify the applicable rate." Id., at ,I46. 
As Wilcox was not a contract action, the Wilcox court declined to apply the interest 
rate in §15-1-1(2). Instead, being a statutory action (addressing state statutory 
bankruptcy preferences), it applied the federal bankruptcy preference interest rate as the 
3 This is the critical distinction between the present case and Sundial. 
4 Snow, at ,I9:" Rule 69 ... states that a sheriff shall 'execute the writ [of execution] 
against the nonexempt property of the judgment debtor by levying on a sufficient amount 
4 Snow, at ,I9:" Rule 69 ... states that a sheriff shall 'execute the writ [of execution] 
against the nonexempt property of the judgment debtor by levying on a sufficient amount 
of property, if there is sufficient property; collecting or selling the choses in action and 
selling the other property in the manner set forth herein. Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)." 
10 
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most appropriate to those claims. Id., at 147. That rate is the federal post-judgment 
interest rate. Id. 
Wilcox limited the scope of§ 15-1-1 to a subset of contract actions and decided 
that neither contract nor statutory actions were automatically governed by § 15-1-1. 
Based on the plain meaning of its terms, Wilcox decided that reflexive application of the 
current § 15-1-1 is not allowed, even for contract cases. Moreover, as Wilcox decided that 
15-1-1 speaks only to (some) contact claims, and the jury decided that no breach of 
contract occurred in the present case, § 15-1-1 does not set the rate of prejudgment 
interest here. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court's discretionary decision 
against applying § 15-1-1 (2). 
2. Court o(Appeals Cases Decided Since Wilcox Generally Adhere to Wilcox. 
Cases decided after Wilcox, including some cited by the Fullers, highlight the 
limits on § 15-1-1 described by the Supreme Court in Wilcox. For example, Highlands at 
Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch County, 2015 UT App 173 (the most recent decision 
addressing § 15-1-1) applied § 15-1-1 because "the lump-sum fees [ at issue] in this context 
... more similar to a contract than to a tax, ... [ and therefore] the trial court was correct to 
apply the statutory default interest rate for most contracts, ... i.e., 10% per year." 
( emphasis added). The Highlands court, therefore, not only considered it a contract case, 
it also acknowledged that § 15-1-1 only applies to "most" contracts. Highlands mirrors 
the scope of§ 15-1-1 decided by Wilcox. 
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Another recent Court of Appeals case cited by the Fullers, David A. Francis v. 
National DME, 350 P.3d 615, 2015 UT App. 119 is also consistent with Wilcox. The 
Fullers concede that National DME did not decide that § 15-1-1 applies in all cases. Appt. 
Brief at 41-42. National DME only decided that it was "not convinced" that the district 
court erred in adhering to one of the interpretations of§ 15-1-1 presented to it. National 
DME, 2015 UT App. 119, 144. This was the result of inadequate briefing by the appellant 
in National DME, which was insufficient to allow the Court of Appeals "to adequately 
address the issue of interpretation on the case ... [and] 'we will not conduct that analysis 
on a party's behalf."' National DME at 144, quoting Nebeker v. Summit County, 2014 UT 
App. 244,127, 338 P.3d 203. National DME declined to reverse the district court's 
decision to apply the 10% rate from § 15-1-1 because any other conclusion was 
inadequately briefed. National DME therefore decided nothing at all about whether § 15-
1-1 applies to any other case, including this one. 
The Fullers disserve the plain language of the statute, which is unambiguous. 
Wilcox did not consider § 15-1-1 ambiguous. The post-Wilcox cases have not decided that 
§ 15-1-1 is ambiguous. The Court should therefore enforce the tenns of§ 15-1-1 as they 
were unambiguously read and limited by Wilcox. 5 
5 Sundial's recitation of§ 15-1-1 excluded material terms from the statute, impermissibly 
rendering the omitted text a nullity. Utah courts "are compelled to give the statutory 
language meaning and to assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly." 
Andreason v. Felsted, 137 P.3d 1, 2006 UT App 188, ,11, citing Labelle v. McKay Dee 
Hosp. Ctr., 2004 UT 15, 116, 89 P.3d 113. "Thus, we construe statutory enactments in a 
way that 'render[s] all parts thereof relevant and meaningful."' Id. Utah courts also 







Wilcox's unanimous Supreme Court opinion tightly limited § 15-1-1 (2) to a 
fraction of all contract actions, and no more. "Just as the default rate specified in section 
§ 15-1-1 (2) does not automatically extend to all judgments obtained in contract cases, it 
does not automatically apply to all judgments based on statute where the legislature has 
failed to specify the applicable rate." Id., at ,I46. As Wilcox was not a contract action, 
the Wilcox court declined to apply the interest rate in §15-1-1(2). 
Contrary to the Fullers' argument to the contrary, the 10% rate of §15-1-1(2) does 
not apply here. Under Fell v. Union Pacific RR, 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907), the district court 
was only required to award prejudgment interest at the legal rate. See id. at 1007 ("Our 
statute (section 1241, Rev. St. 1898) is general, allowing interest in all cases at the legal 
rate, in the absence of an agreement."/ If it ever did so, § 15-1-1 no longer sets interest at 
Sundial's abbreviated version of§ 15-1-1 (2) reveals the problem: "the legal rate of 
[prejudgment] interest for ... any ... chose in action shall be 10% per annum." Sundial, 
2013 UT App 223, il 8. This excluded 20 of the 35 words in subsection two, including the 
entire introductory phrase and other relevant modifiers that constrict its application to 
contracts. The Sundial court effectively rewrote the statute to reflect its pre-1985 non-
contractual terms, rather than reading § 15-1-1 as it currently stands. 
Sundial was not presented with the present question ( of whether § 15-1-1 sets the 
prejudgment interest rate for a non-contract damages award). The Sundial parties did not 
contest whether § 15-1-1 would apply to a chose in action (unjust enrichment) that was 
not the subject of a contract claim. See id., at ,IS. In addition, Sundial affirmed the denial 
of prejudgment interest for unjust enrichment. See id., at iJiJS-11. 
Sundial sheds no light on the district court's or this Court's reading of§ 15-1-1 as to 
whether it covers anything other than a contract. 
6 Section 1241 (Rev. 1898) is, indeed, far broader than the current statute. It reads as 
follows: 
Agreement governs. Eight per cent in absence of agreement. 
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the legal rate "in all cases." The current statute only sets the interest rate for agreements 
which do not themselves set an interest rate. 
Using the post-judgment rate was within the district court's discretion when 
awarding interest and within the bounds of controlling and persuasive precedent that 
mirrored the stmcture of Utah's post-judgment interest statute, § 15-1-4. 7 
The Fullers' appeal should therefore be denied and the district court's decision 
affirmed. 
B. The District Court Correctly Construed §15-1-1 When Deciding that It 
Did Not Prescribe the Interest Rate for this Case. 
The district court appropriately decided that § 15-1-1 did not apply to the common 
law claims for which Western States were found liable by the jury in this case. Western 
States submits that this was the correct decision, based on the plain language of the 
statute (as well as under Wilcox), and was within the district court's discretion. 
"No1mally, when interpreting statutory language, we first examine the statute's 
plain language and resort to other methods of statutory interpretation only if the language 
It shall be lawful to take eight per cent interest per annum, when the amount of 
interest has not been specified or agreed upon. But parties may agree in writing for 
the payment of any rate of interest whatever, on money due or to become due on 
any contract. Any judgment rendered on such contract shall confonn thereto, and 
bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the 
judgment. 
Section 1241 (Rev. 1898) thereby inverts the language of the current 15-1-1. Section 
1241 begins with the general case-that 8% may be taken, without qualification. It then 
proceeds to the narrower circumstance-that parties may contract for any interest rate 
and that the judgment shall impose and reflect that rate. In contrast, § 15-1-1 starts by 
presuming the existence of a contract, and narrows its scope from that point. 





is ambiguous." National DME, 350 P.3d 615, 2015 UT App. 119, 144, quoting State v. 
Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotations omitted). Utah courts 
"are compelled to give the statutory language meaning and to assume that each term in 
the statute was used advisedly." Andreason v. Felsted, 137 P.3d 1, 2006 UT App 188, 
111, citing Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 2004 UT 15, 116, 89P.3d113. "Thus, we 
construe statutory enactments in a way that 'render[ s] all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful."' Id. Utah courts also "avoid an interpretation which renders portions of, or 
words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative" or makes a statute "unreasonably confused 
or inoperable." Id. Finally, when the "meaning of a statute can be discerned from its 
language, no other interpretive tools are needed." Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch 
Partnership, 2011 UT 50,115 and n.10, 267 P.3d 863, citing Nelson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 
905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995) ("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be 
held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction.") 
The complete text of§ 15-1-1 reads as follows: 
15-1-1. Interest rates -- Contracted rate -- Legal rate. 
( 1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the 
loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of 
their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the 
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in 
action shall be 10% per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any penalty 
or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract 
or obligations made before May 14, 1981. 
The text of§ 15-1-1 as a whole provides context for each of its subsections. First, 
§ 15-1-1 ( 1) and (2) each begin with a condition predicate by addressing only the "parties 
15 
to a lawful contract." This limiting condition alone moves the present case out of the 
scope of§ 15-1-1. 
Second, the statute sets the "the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of 
any money, goods, or chose in action." §15-1-1(2). It does not set the "legal rate of 
interest" without qualification or in all circumstances. The Fullers adopt an ellipsed 
version of the statute created by Sundial ("the legal rate of [prejudgment] interest for ... 
any ... chose in action shall be 10% per annum"; 2013 UT App 223, 18) and hope that 
deleting 20 of the 35 words in § 15-1-1 (2) might preserve the meaning of the sentence and 
of the subsection within the context of§ 15-1-1 as a whole. Yet, Wilcox and Highlands 
both indicate that the Fullers' suggested meaning is not plausible, as each confim1s that 
§ 15-1-1 applies to a subset of contracts, and nothing more. 8 
Third, subsection one also requires a contract. Rather than the incomplete version 
promoted by Sundial and the Fullers, § 15-1-1 ( 1) may be properly shortened-without 
changing its intent-to read "The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of 
interest for ... the subject of their contract." Any of the contractual subjects listed in § 15-
1-1 (1 )-whether they are an exhaustive listing or not-are simply that: subjects of a 
contract, for which an interest rate may be set by said contract. 
This parallels the substance and wording of subsection two: that "Unless parties to 
8 Moreover, the Fullers conceded that Western States' reading of§ 15-1-1 is plausible. 
Specifically, regarding Justice Zimmerman's interpretation of§ 15-1-1 in Consolidation 
Coal, the Fullers stated that, "there's no question you could read the statute that way." R. 
1973: 15 ( 18-19). "That way" is the interpretation proffered by W estem States and 
adopted by the district court. In addition, it is clear from the district court's decision 
declining to apply § 15-1-1 that it adopted the Zimmennan/Wi/cox reading of the statute, 
even if it did not expressly state its reasoning in that way. 
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a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of interest ... shall be 
10% per annum." As in § 15-1-1 (I), the inclusion of "the loan or forbearance of any 
money, goods, or chose in action" in § 15-1-1 (2) has a preceding requirement - that a 
contract exist in the first place. Rather than operating in a vacuum imagined by the 
Fullers, the interest rate provided by § 15-1-1 (2) simply acts as a gap-filler if none was 
provided by the very contract between the very parties' mentioned in § 15-1-1 ( 1 ). 
Subsection two only has meaning for parties if subsection one first applies to them. 
This interpretation is supp011ed by controlling case law. In Wilcox, the Supreme 
Court refused to apply prejudgment interest per § 15-1-1 specifically because no contract 
existed, and explained its reasoning as follows: 
"The theoretical underpinning behind section 15-1-1 is that the parties to a lawful 
contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of money, 
goods, or causes of action that are the subject of their contract. Only when the 
parties to a contract fail to specify a rate of interest does the default rate specified 
in section 15-1-1(2) apply. But this case is not a contract action. There was no 
contract between Anchor Wate and the Liquidator and therefore no opportunity for 
the parties to agree upon an applicable rate of interest." 
Wilcox, at ,I44 (emphasis added). 
The Fullers' central case after Fell-Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 
546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976)-only addressed the denial of interest and the refusal to 
instruct about interest. The Uinta opinion did not decide or address whether its version of 
§ 15-1-1 set the applicable rate. 
Moreover, the relevant language of§ 15-1-1 in effect under Uinta was materially 
different than the present version of§ 15-1-1 : 
"The legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or 
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things in action shall be six per cent per annum." 
15-1-1(1953), Appt. Brief Addendum, at 12.9 
The word "contract" never appears in the statute in effect when Uinta was 
decided. In fact, as shown by the Fullers' Opening Brief Addendum of predecessor 
statutes, the word "contract" did not appear at any time from 1907 (the year of Fell 's 
decision) until 1989. Appt. Brief Addend., at 3-12. As a result, the statutory language of 
§ 15-1-1 and its predecessors, from Fell through Uinta and SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & 
Faber, 732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986), reflects a materially different legislative intent than the 
present legislative intent of§ 15-1-1 as enacted in 1989 .10 
This also makes clear that which the Fullers wish to obscure. As of 1994, 
Consolidation Coal was only the second Supreme Court case citing the 1989 language of 
§ 15-1-1. Far from expressing some aberrant view of an ancient statute, Justice 
Zimmerman was simply reading a recently and materially altered statute. It is therefore 
unsurprising that § 15-1-1 's applicability and scope would differ from the preceding 
decades, and its changed relationship to Fell should be entirely expected and 
9 15-1-1 was again amended in 1981, with the only change being the rate of interest: "The 
legal rate of interest 'for the loan or forbearance money, goods or things in action shall be 
six per eent 10% per annum." Appt. Brief Addend., at 14. (Strikeout and underline 
original). 
10 The version enacted in 1985 is largely the same as the current version (passed in 1989), 
adding the qualification that it applies to contracts, and reads in relevant part as follows: 
"Except when parties to a lawful contract agree on a specified rate of interest, the legal 
rate of interest for the loan or forebearance of any money, goods, or [thiftgs] chose in 
action shall be 10% per annum." Appt. Brief Addend., at 16. (Strikeout and underline 
original).Similarly, § 15-1-1 (2) was first enacted, and read: "The parties to a lawful 
contract may agree upon rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of money, goods, or 




Other cases cited by the Fullers are inapposite for other reasons. For example, 
Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7,210 P.3d 263, awarded a 
breach of contract. This fits squarely within Wilcox's limits on § 15-1-1, and therefore 
does not affect the present analysis. 12 
Ultimately, the lion's share of the Fullers' argument-addressing the history, 
intent, and case law surrounding the current § 15-1-1 's predecessor statutes-is not 
required, as the meaning of the current § 15-1-1 is clear. Further, the Fullers' analysis is 
inapposite until 1989 at the earliest, as the plain language and intent of§ 15-1-1 from Fell 
through Uinta and SCM materially changed in 1989, and continued no further. 
In sum, based on a plain reading of the current text of§ 15-1-1, the statute does not 
apply to this case. Should the Court consider the history and relevant case law, it should 
discount such before 1989, as the tenns and intent of§ 15-1-1 materially changed at that 
time. It was no coincidence that Justice Zimmerman doubted in 1994 the ongoing validity 
11 It appears that Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992) (later abrogated by 
statute) was the only Supreme Court case addressing § 15-1-1 in its current fonn prior to 
Consolidation Coal. Nielsen sued the uninsured drivers who collided with his vehicle and 
his own insurer, and at trial was awarded $250,000 under his $250,000 uninsured driver 
insurance policy coverage. While the Nielsen court did not expressly construe § 15-1-1, it 
refused to award prejudgment interest under the post-1989 language of§ 15-1-1 because 
Nielsen did not allege a breach of contract (and because the terms of the insurance policy 
limited liability to the fixed amount of $250,000, including interest). 
12 In addition, the Encon opinion mentions, without further detail or analysis, that the 
district court applied § 15-1-1 (2) to set the interest rate at 10% when calculating interest. 
Encon at n.20. The appeal to the Supreme Court never questioned whether that was the 
appropriate statute or rate, and so the Encon court had no reason to question that 
application nor any putative construction of 15-1-1. Encon sheds no light here. 
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of any case applying § 15-1-1 beyond a contract; the statute had been greatly limited by 
the legislature only five years prior. That it took until 2009 for Wilcox to unanimously 
adopt his reading is of no import; it only matters that the Supreme Court finally voted and 
spoke on the question with one voice. 
The district court correctly construed § 15-1-1 when deciding that it did not 
provide the interest rate for the common law claims in this case, as the jury decided that 
no breach of contract occun-ed, nor decided that a contract ever existed. The Court should 
therefore affirm the district court's refusal to apply the I 0% interest rate of§ 15-1-1. 
C. Persuasive Utah Case Law Shows that the District Court's Application 
of the Post-Judgment Interest Rate Set by §15-1-4 Was Appropriate 
and Within its Discretion. 
This Court should affinn the district court's decision to apply Utah's post-
judgment rate of interest when calculating prejudgment interest. Persuasive Utah court 
decisions applying the post-judgment rate provided a reasonable basis for the district 
court to do so in this case. 
Other Utah courts have recognized that § 15-1-1 is not applicable for setting 
prejudgment interest rates for non-contract damages. Those courts, in exercising their 
equitable discretion, have adopted post-judgment interest rates (whether set by § 15-1-4 or 
some other rate significantly lower than the 10% set by § 15-1-1) as most appropriate for 
calculating prejudgment interest. 
For example, in Klein v. Patterson, 2: 11-cv-723-CW (D. Utah, September 30, 





only to those which are the subject of a contract. "While the statute does refer to a 'chose 
in action,' it does so within the context of 'a lawful contract.' A fraudulent transfer does 
not fall under the realm of contract law. The court therefore concludes that section 15-1-
1 (2) is inapplicable." Id. The Klein court then adopted the interest rate set in a 
persuasive order issued by the Tenth Circuit in Wing v. Gillis, No. 12- 4071 ( I 0th Cir. 
May 21, 2013) ( unpublished). Wing cited that where the rate of prejudgment interest is 
not set by statute, the appropriate rate lies "within the sound discretion of the court." Id., 
citing Caldwell v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 287 F.3d 1276, 1287 (10th Cir. 2002). The 
litigants in Wing advocated the 10% rate set by § 15-1-1 on the one hand, and the federal 
post-judgment rate (approximately 2.08%) 13 on the other. The Wing court affirmed that 
the trial court's adoption of 5% as an explicitly middle ground figure was within its 
discretion. Judge Waddoups then adopted the 5% simple interest rate from Wing as the 
appropriate prejudgment interest rate where § 15-1-1 did not apply, specifically because 
the chose in action was not the subject of a contract. 
Similarly, in Peterson v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 113, if,J56-58, 253 P .3d 1096, the 
Utah Court of Appeals affirmed trial court's equitable decision to use of the post-
judgment rate in § 15-1-4 to calculate prejudgment interest in the statutory dissolution of a 
privately held corporation. While the statute at issue ( § 16-1 Oa-1434) provided only that 
13 The Wing decision did not state the post-judgment rate. For this brief, the rate was 
derived from the United States Courts website link to historical rates listing the interest 
rate for February 6, 2008, the date affirmed by Wing as the appropriate date to commence 
prejudgment interest. Available at http://www.LJ~c;.9~1rts._gov/FormsA11Qf_~es/Fees/Post-
judgment I ntcrestRates.aspx; http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h 15/20080211/ 
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interest "may be allowed at the rate and from the date determined by the court to be 
equitable," Peterson affirmed that the use of the post-judgment rate in § 15-1-4 was 
"rational" and did not exceed its discretion. Id. at if58. 
Finally, a federal case previously cited by Plaintiffs regarding prejudgment 
interest, Krum v. Hartford Life & Acc. Co., 942 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (D. Utah 2013), set its 
prejudgment interest rate using § 15-1-1 without reasoning or discussion. However, Krum 
cited to the same Tenth Circuit case relied on by Wing for its authority that a trial court 
has the discretion to set prejudgment interest rates, namely Caldwell v. Life Ins. Co. of 
North America, 287 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2002). Ironically, Caldwell, like Wilcox, did 
not apply § 15-1-1. Caldwell applied the federal post-judgment rate in calculating the 
prejudgment interest rate for damages resulting from unpaid disability benefits. Id., at 
1287. 
These cases provide a reasonable basis for the district court's application of the 
post-judgment interest rate in this case. Similarly, Utah's post-judgment interest statute, 
U.C.A. § 15-1-4, follows the demarcation between contract and non-contract actions, a 
distinction related to that made in Wilcox for understanding the limited application of 
§ 15-1-1. Section 15-1-4 specifies that contacting parties may set their own interest rates, 
and that such rates will apply to prejudgment interest. All other claims, such as the 
claims here, use the federal rate plus 2%. U.C.A. § l 5-l-4(3)(a). 
As a whole, Title 15 Chapter I applies one set of mies to contract actions, and 
another set of mies for all other claims, including the tort claims awarded by the jury in 
this case. The post-judgment rate is the only applicable rate set by the Utah legislature, 
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and the structure of Title 15 Chapter 1 supports its adoption and use here. 
The district court's decision that the limited scope of§ 15-1-1, as already defined 
by the Supreme Court in Wilcox, did not include the claims awarded by the jury in this 
case. The district court's decision to apply Utah's federal post-judgment simple interest 
rate of 2.27% per annum 14 to calculate prejudgment interest was within its discretion, as 
it had at least one reasonable basis (if not more). It therefore should be affirmed, and the 
Fullers' appeal denied. 
II. THE PARTIES STIPULATED ONLY TO WITHDRAW JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 29 AND THAT PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WOULD 
APPLY TO PROPERTY DAMAGE. 
Should this Court decide that the foregoing has not resolved this appeal and that it 
requires further analysis, Western States respectfully submits that any stipulation 
concerning the withdrawal of Jury Instruction No. 29 was limited and properly construed 
by the district court, appropriately exercising its discretion. In the alternative, the district 
court properly reformed the stipulation to correct the parties' mutual mistake underlying 
the stipulation and/or reflect the limitations of the meeting of their minds. 
Moreover, any error regarding the scope of the stipulation was invited by the 
Fullers themselves; and their false accusation that Western States engaged in a deliberate 
14 Utah law uses the federal post-judgment rate as of the start of the calendar year in 
which a judgment is entered (rather than the interest rate from the particular week of a 
judgment). "Except as otherwise provided by law, all other final civil and criminal 
judgments of the district court and justice court shall bear interest at the federal post-
judgment interest rate as of January I of each year, plus 2%." U.C.A. § 15-l-4(3)(a). The 
rate set by the Utah Supreme Court for 2015 was 2.27%. See 
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/intrates/interestrates.htm 
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"bait and switch approach" is not supported by the record and defamatory. It should be 
struck from the record, or at least disregarded. 
Lastly, Western States preserved its objections and is therefore not estopped from 
making its arguments here. Western States did not request relief from a stipulation agreed 
in scope; it questioned the scope of such stipulation. When the perceived scope of their 
stipulation to withdraw Jury Instruction No. 29 and interest-related determinations came 
to light, the issues were timely raised by Western States and fully vetted in the district 
court. 
The Fullers' appeal should be denied on any of these grounds. 
A. The District Court Correctly Decided That the Parties Intended to 
Withdraw Jury Instruction No. 29 and Permit the Court To Make 
Additional Determinations Required for the Interest Calculation. 
Jury Instruction No. 29 was withdrawn by stipulation of the parties. However, the 
terms and scope of its withdrawal are at issue. 
Stipulations are construed as any other contract. "[A] cardinal rule in construing ... 
a contract is to give effect to the intentions of the parties." Coulter & Smith v Russell, 966 
P.2d 852, 857-58 (Utah 1998); Maw v. Noble, 354 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah 1960) ("if the 
intent of the parties can be ascertained with reasonable certainty it must be given effect") 
(emphasis added) (additional citations omitted). "[I]ntent is gleaned from the totality of 
the circumstances." Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins., 839 P.2d 798, 810 (Utah 
1992) .... " 
A meeting of the minds is "basic" to a stipulation. Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 
335 (Utah App. 1987). " ... [D]eterminations as to the intended scope of a stipulation ... 
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present questions of fact that are appropriately directed, in the first instance, to the district 
court. Prinsburg State Bank, v. Abundo 2011 UT App 239, 18,262 P.3d 454, citing 
Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass'n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, 
LC, 2009 UT 65,173,221 P.3d 234 ("The intent of the parties involves a question of fact 
and should be dealt with accordingly.") 
Here, the parties' stipulation to withdraw Jury Instruction No. 29 was oral and 
never clearly memorialized, making the intentions of the parties more difficult to glean. 
The District Court concluded that Western States stipulated that prejudgment interest 
applied to a property damage verdict. It also correctly recognized that the parties did not 
stipulate to a binding prejudgment interest rate. 
The parties did not, as suggested by the Fullers, simply discuss and then withdraw 
Jury Instruction No. 29 because all questions related to prejudgment interest had been 
decided. Rather, as reflected in a more complete quotation from the record, the parties 
began discussing prejudgment interest in connection with creating a Special Verdict form 
at the urging of the Fullers. Questions about damages, interest, and the Special Verdict 
form itself were interrelated and interspersed through the record: 
THE COURT: [W]e were arguing a special verdict form, and the question is 
whether there should be one damages line or a separate line for rent and for the 
other damages. I have indicated that I want them broken out. . . [because] I 
thought that in the event my pretrial rulings with respect to rent were wrong, it 
would help alleviate the need for a potential retrial. Mr. Christiansen ... objects to 
it and believes that the more efficient and appropriate fonn would be one that just 
has a single damage line .... 
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MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor, may I raise one more thing along the lines 
of what we've been talking about? ... [T]here really are three broad categories of 
damage items[ ... : ]property damage, prejudgment interest, and lost rent. And I 
would propose that we have separate lines for each of those, because that's the 
way that I've presented the case. If we're going to break out the two, we might as 
well break out the three. 
MR. BARRETT: So the question is whether prejudgment interest needs to be 
separated? 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: ... I'm not asking for prejudgment interest on the rent. It's 
based only on the personal property. 
MR. BARRETT: Okay. Prejudgment interest wouldn't necessarily be based upon 
what's (inaudible) prope1iy. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Right, and we've instructed on that, and I'll argue on that, 
but-
MR. BARRETT: So I'm not sure the jury decides -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well, if we tell them there's three - these three different 
areas of damages, but then they only have two lines to deal from, it's going to 
confuse them. I don't want to have to be resorting to saying, collapse these two -
THE COURT: That's fine. 
MR. BARRETT: I'm not opposed. 
THE COURT: Yeah, that's fine. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay. Very good ... 
(Inaudible conversation from 11 :56:38 to 12:02:50) 
MR. BARRETT: Your Honor, if we can, we were having discussion about 
whether the special verdict fonn should allow, in addition to a damage line for 
property as well as a damage line for rent, whether it should also have 
prejudgment interest. And during the break, I was able to look at the MUJI, Model 
Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition, special verdict form CV 1899, and it is in 
the context of a fraud instmction, which is a variation of the negligent 
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misrepresentation, so I realize it's not particularly analogous, but in this, it 
indicates that counsel should specify the type of damages, in this case economic 
and non-economic. Our case, there are no non. And damages so the judge can 
calculate prejudgment interest. Your Honor, I would prefer that that remain the 
situation here. 
THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Christiansen. So, I mean, you're asking for it, but I 
- my experience has always been the opposite. Where I'm - if there is a dispute, I 
can - I mean, if there's no dispute -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: We've got an instruction in on it. 
THE COURT: We can strike the instruction. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well, but I want the jury to decide whether they're -
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest. You're not saying the 
Court would make that determination. 
THE COURT: Well, are you - is there any argument about whether -
MR. BARRETT: No -
THE COURT: - they're entitled to prejudgment interest? 
MR. BARRETT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BARRETT: If there's a property damage -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay. 
MR. BARRETT: - there's going to be prejudgment interest -
THE COURT: Right, so you're - it - your - they're -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Then I'm okay with that. 
THE COURT: Right. Exactly .... 
THE COURT: I didn't - I didn't - it's - we're on the same page. I don't see that 
there's a disagreement about whether they're entitled to it or not. What I'll do is, it's 
in there, and when we get to it, instruct them to just strike it out, that the Court will 
27 
- well, just strike that out, that that's no longer a part of the instructions. And you 
can tell them that.. .. 
THE COURT: All right, so take it out - look, part of me - it's a simple calculation, 
so I really didn't care much, because it's a 10 percent calculation and you can do it 
in your head. I also don't think, as I said, there's any - it's - the amount is fine. But 
as a technical matter, this is the better approach. 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yep. Okay, so jury Instruction No. 29 is withdrawn. 
R. 1969:67-74. 
While the Fullers try to make hay of the district court's musing that it could do a 
10% calculation in its head, that aside does not mean that the parties agreed that the rate 
was a settled question. Nor do these discussions-including the district court's 
statements-in any way impute the correctness of any proposed and conditional interest 
rate. "The amount is fine," in the totality of the circumstances, can easily refer to the fact 
that the parties agreed that interest could be applied to property damages, but not to rent 
damages (which the court and parties had spent several minutes discussing and parsing, at 
the Fullers' insistence as much as anyone's). Prejudgment interest was also predicated on 
the breach of contract claim as W estem States conceded there was a legitimate basis for 
applying § 15-1-1 in many contract cases; and, at that moment, breach of contract was still 
a pending claim available to the jury. "The amount is fine" can also equally refer to the 
final layout of the Special Verdict form, given all of the discussions - about considering 
and finally including separate lines for property damages amounts, a line for rent 
damages amounts, and ultimately no line for interest damages amounts ( as the judge 




determine the date from which interest would accme ). The record reflects that this was 
the full scope of discussions leading up to the removal of Jury Instmction No. 29, no less 
and no more. 15 
The district court determined that that Western States stipulated to interest on 
property damage. 16 
MR. BARRETT: I'm not precluded from arguing there's no date certain, there's no 
measuring by facts and figures, and that the-
THE COURT: Yes ... you are. That's what I'm saying. Because, to the extent that 
my memorandum decision was inconsistent with that, the stipulation -- they're 
entitled to it. Now the question is when the date starts -
MR. BARRETT: Okay . 
15 Western States further explained its intent at the subsequent January 29, 2015 
telephonic motion hearing arguments on interest rates after supplemental briefing ordered 
by the district court: that interest was not a foregone conclusion, and that its award and 
amount depended on findings by the jury (about particular claims) and the court (about 
the rate, date that interest started accruing, etc.): 
COURT: it was clear to me, Mr. Barrett, from reviewing the transcript, that Mr. 
Christiansen was led into withdrawing that instruction, which had been approved, 
based on an understanding that if they were successful, and we didn't separate any 
claims - ... his clients were entitled to prejudgment interest. [That did not depend 
on whether the elements of certain claims were met.] 
MR. BARRETT: if that's what - if that's what I said to the Court, that's not my 
intent. 
R. 1973 :6-7. While the district court decided that interest was a foregone conclusion on 
all claims related to property damage, the conversation also illuminates where the parties' 
minds did and did not meet. 
16 Western States did not intend to simply stipulate to the availability of interest on all 
claims, as the Instruction No. 29 depended on which if any claims were found valid by 
the jury. It was never clear that negligent misrepresentation required the application of 
interest, and any stipulation to that was inadvertent. (See fn ( 12):"if that's what I said to 
the Court, that's not my intent.") 
29 
THE COURT: - and what the number is. That's what I'm saying ... 
COURT: But I think it's clear [counsel for the Fullers] withdrew that instruction 
thinking, I'm entitled to prejudgment interest. If I win, we're just going to calculate 
it. 
R. I 973: 10-11. 
The record thereby shows that the district court cabined the parties' stipulation in 
keeping with the discussions in their totality. 
First, the parties and the Court decided that there would be separate damages lines 
on the special verdict form. Second, the parties revisited interest because the MUJI 
guided that while the jury could decide questions of fact related to interest, the court 
should calculate interest. Third, the District Court itself proposed that Jury Instruction 
No. 29 be withdrawn altogether. Fourth, the parties agreed that interest would apply to 
property damages but not rent damages, and that this made sense of the separate verdict 
form lines for those distinct damages. At that time, Western States believed that predicate 
detenninations about interest remained, including the start date for accrual, whether the 
damages were fixed and reasonably certain, and the rate. The Court agreed that there 
were further determinations required, but only about the start date and the rate. But these 
differences of view were not apparent until after the verdict was rendered. Fifth, Jury 
Instruction No. 29 was withdrawn, and the calculation of interest reserved to the court. 
Sixth, once the Fullers filed their Motion for Entry of Judgment seeking I 0% interest 
30 
from February 3, 2007, and Western States objected as to the date and the rate, 17 the 
ambiguity of the parties' stipulation to withdraw Instruction No. 29 became apparent. 
The Fullers now ask this Court to abandon the totality of these circumstances in 
favor of an alternate reality where the terms of withdrawal were expressly agreed and 
there were no predicate detenninations remaining. As reflected by the record, the Fullers' 
suggested scenario never actually occurred. 18 
Instead, after extensive review of the record, the district court concluded that the 
parties only stipulated to remove Jury Instruction No. 29 and that prejudgment interest 
would apply to property damage and not to rent damage - but the parties did not stipulate 
to a 10% interest rate. The record shows that other questions were indisputably reserved 
to the district court, including the start date for accrual of interest. The record supports 
the district court's reasonable basis for its determination of the scope of the parties 
stipulation and its enforcement of that scope. This Court should therefore affirm the 
district court's decision on this question. 
17 The date was later agreed to by the Fullers as June 13, 2007. R.1973: 13. 
18 The Prinsburg test cited by the Fullers necessarily assumes that the scope of a 
stipulation is settled when considering setting aside a stipulation. It does not address the 
scope of the stip itself, which is what's at issue. The scope of the stip requires 
interpretation of an oral contract, which is shown by the transcripts (which have several 
gaps labeled as "inaudible" by the transcriptionist). 
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B. Withdrawal of Jury Instruction No. 29 Did Not Require That the 
District Court Apply a 10% Interest Rate, Which Would Have Been 
An Error of Law. 
Even if the parties somehow agreed to a 10% prejudgment interest rate in 
proposed Jury Instruction No. 29 discussing a claim that was never presented to the jury, 
the district court was not bound by such a stipulation because it was an error of law. 
A court may refuse to provide an instruction that includes an error of law .19 
Likewise, the court would not be bound by a stipulation by the parties to instruct itself in 
such a way, and was free to revisit the question of the appropriate prejudgment interest 
rate once the issue was brought to its attention. The district court did not err in doing so. 
Indeed, it would have been error for the district court to not address an error of law 
brought to its attention. See Wilson v. lHC Hospitals, Inc., 2012 UT 43, 152 n.15, 289 
P.3d 369 ("A trial court abuses its discretion if it commits legal error.")2° 
Moreover, Instruction No. 29 was prepared for the jury, not the court. The 
instruction describes a "claim" for interest; but no claim for interest was presented to the 
jury. The district court need not be instructed on the law; it needs to decide the law. The 
19 Miller v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 2012 UT 54, 113, 285 P.3d 1208 (A "trial court may 
properly refuse to give requested instructions where it does not accurately reflect the law 
governing the factual situation of the case.") 
20 Sister courts agree that "a reviewing court is not bound by an erroneous stipulation as 
to a conclusion of law which is not a stipulation of fact." See, e.g., Valdez v. Taylor 
Automobile Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 810,278 P.2d 91 (Cal.App. 1954). It makes no sense to 
require that a court enforce stipulated errors of law when that same court is not required 




parties stipulated to removing numerous questions related to interest from the jury and 
reserved them for the court. 
Further, the parties contemplated a 10% rate of interest based on the anticipated 
facts to be presented at trial. The jury had yet to find any facts when the instruction was 
withdrawn. 
Lastly, even if the parties stipulated to a 10% interest rate under §15-1-1, the 
district court was required to revisit that if it later appeared to be legal error, as a trial 
court never has discretion to commit an error oflaw. Wilson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 2012 
UT 43, ,I 52 n.15, 289 P .3d 369 ("A trial court abuses its discretion if it commits legal 
error.") 
Therefore, the district court acted within its discretion by considering the 
applicable and appropriate rate of interest in this case after the withdrawal of Jury 
Instruction No. 29, regardless of whether the interest rate was stipulated or not. 
C. In the Alternative, the District Court Correctly Reformed the 
Stipulation, Which was Based on the Parties' Mutual Mistake as to the 
Rate of Interest. 
In the alternative and based on the foregoing, the parties' stipulation to withdraw 
Jury Instruction No. 29 was based on a mutual mistake that the prejudgment interest rate 
was stipulated at 10% and that this was the appropriate prejudgment interest rate. Utah 
law is clear that "[a] mutual mistake of fact can provide the basis for equitable 
rescission or reformation of a contract even when the contract appears on its face to be a 
complete and binding integrated agreement." Burningham v. Westgate Resorts, Ltd., 2013 
UT App 244, ,I 12, 317 P.3d 445 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks 
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omitted). "A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a 
misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their 
bargain," id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and subsequently fail to 
reduce their actual intent to writing, FDIC v. Taylor, 2011 UT App 416,, 47,267 P.3d 
949. See also Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42,, 19, 48 P.3d 941 (noting 
that mutual mistake "warrants the reformation" of a contract where, among other things, 
"the instrument as made failed to conform to what the parties intended" ( citation and 
internal quotations omitted)). 
The parties here stipulated to withdrawing Jury Instruction No. 29 consistent with 
Fell. That case makes clear that loss of property will be remedied by damages, to which 
prejudgment interest will be added if the amount of damages can be mathematically fixed 
as of a certain date. Fell, at 88 P.3d 1003, 1007. If and when those conditions are met, 
interest may be calculated at the "legal rate." Id. At the time of Fell, the legal rate was set 
by statute at 8% for all claims, unless the parties to a contract set it at another rate.21 
At the point that Jury Instruction No. 29 was withdrawn, there was no agreement 
about the amount of damages, from what date interest might accrue, or the applicable rate 
of interest - all aspects of the interest calculation that were as yet undetermined. 
Where a mutual mistake is alleged, the court may consider parol evidence. See, 
e.g., Kendall Insurance v. R&R Inc. 189 P.3d 114, 2008 UT App 235, ,16 (affirming 
equitable recission of an integrated, written contract based on mutual mistake of fact). 
That's exactly what the district court did here; it went beyond the oral agreement to 
21 See n.6, infra, for the text of the statute in effect at the time of Fell. 
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withdraw Jury Instruction No. 29 and looked (repeatedly) at the record of the parties' 
statements leading up and culminating in the withdrawal. See, e.g., R. 1973:1, 3, 7. Upon 
realizing the parties' disagreement, and reviewing both the record and the parties 
arguments about the bases for and the scope of the stipulation, the district court correctly 
decided that the interest rate was not stipulated. 
The district court summarized the circumstances in its January 6, 2015 decision. It 
later vacated the parts of that decision that might question whether interest would be 
awarded, but it did not vacate the decision in its entirety. Questions about the amount, 
including the rate, lingered. The following January 29, 2015 excerpt describes the parts of 
the district court's previous decision which were modified and which were undisturbed: 
" ... [Western States] did not stipulate to an absolute award of any prejudgment 
interest that [the Fullers] requested. Rather, in withdrawing the jury instruction on 
that issue, the parties agreed that the [ c ]ourt should make the final determination 
regarding prejudgment interest after the conclusion of the trial and add that 
amount to the final judgment." R. 1796. "In order to determine ... what the amount 
of interest is, ... [ and] [g]iven the parties' agreement that the [ c ]ourt should make 
the final determination of prejudgment interest, I believe that further briefing on 
the prejudgment issue would be appropriate." Id. 
After the parties provided supplemental briefing, the district court explained its views of 
the briefs at the start of additional argument, in order to elicit clarification from the 
parties: 
"I'm going to stick by my preliminary ruling that there was a stipulation as to the 
entitlement of prejudgment interest, and that it was based on that stipulation that 
Mr. Christiansen withdrew [I]nstruction 29. That leaves, though, the question of 
the calculation, and I had said in chambers on the record, to the extent anything in 
my memorandum decision is inconsistent with that ruling or this ruling, I'm 
vacating that portion of the memorandum decision." 
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R.1973: 12. The court then heard the parties' additional argument, and decided the interest 
rate question later the same day: 
"I have spent some more time considering the question of the appropriate rate in 
this matter, and re-reviewed some of the authorities. I am convinced that the post 
judgment rate is appropriate, not the 10 percent rate in this matter." 
R.1973:20. 
In sum, the district court's decisions to reconsider the appropriate interest rate and 
to apply the post-judgment rate may be affirmed as a reformation of the stipulation to 
withdraw the instruction as to the interest rate, which had been based on a mutual mistake 
regarding the scope of the stipulation and was also an error of law. 
The Fullers' appeal can and should be denied on this alternative ground. 
D. Any Error Regarding the Stipulation to Withdraw Jury Instruction 
No. 29 Was Invited By the Fullers. 
The district court's statement that "the amount is fine" is not appealable, as it was 
not part of any order of the court; it was an ambiguous remark of the court, at most. In 
addition, any error regarding the withdrawal of Jury Instruction No. 29 results from 
ambiguity sanctioned or unquestioned by the Fullers, and any resulting error was 
therefore invited. 
The parties (and the court) agreed that not all questions related to interest were 
stipulated away; the date of accrual was always in question. Compare R.1805-06; and 
R.1840. In addition, at the time of the stipulation, neither liability nor an amount of 
damages were resolved. R.1969:68-73. While the Fullers apparently thought the interest 
rate was settled, their understanding was singular and not shared by others. When the 
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district court reviewed the record, the withdrawal of Jury Instruction No. 29 was 
premised only on the award of interest, not on a particular calculation of interest. 22 
The Fullers effectively seek to appeal the district court's isolated comments in an 
effort to justify reversal - in particular, by referencing the court's remark "the amount" as 
"fine." Appt. Brief at 22, 26. Such statements are not appealable, as they only guided the 
parties' arguments. A similar situation was address in Braun v. Nevada Chemicals, 
Jnc.,2010 UT App 188,236 P.3d 176. Braun, upon hearing that the court was leaning 
against his position and considering dismissal of his complaint with prejudice, willingly 
withdrew his complaint to avoid that outcome and refile under an alternative theory. Id., 
at ,14. Braun later argued that the court's comments before his withdrawal showed that 
the court had decided against him, and that withdrawal was simply the efficient means to 
an appealable end. Id., at ,14. 
The Court of Appeals distinguished a court's comments from an appealable 
action: 
"[B]y withdrawing his ... complaint in order to avoid the risk of a dismissal with 
prejudice, [Braun] failed to obtain a ruling from the trial court that he could 
challenge on appeal. The judge expressed her preliminary opinion of Defendants' 
motion to dismiss, but she did not grant or deny the motion. Comments such as 
those by the trial judge here are useful to guide counsel's argument, are entirely 
appropriate, and are not appealable. " [T]he law is well settled ... that the 
statements made by a trial judge are not the judgment of the case and it is only the 
signed judgment that prevails .... [No order of the court] dismissed the complaint; 
Plaintiff withdrew it." 
22 
" ••• [T]here was a stipulation as to the entitlement of prejudgment interest, and that it 
was based on that stipulation that Mr. Christiansen withdrew Instruction No. 29. That 
leaves, though, the question of the calculation .... " R.1973: 12. 
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Braun, ,Il4, citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978) (affirming the district 
court's written, signed ruling even though it differed from that court's prior oral ruling)." 
Here, the Fullers agreed to withdraw Jury Instruction No. 29. That did not prevent 
the Fullers from presenting their evidence or argument to the jury or the court, before, 
during, or after the trial. The court's statement that "the amount is fine" can relate to 
several aspects of the discussions about the Special Verdict form, the multiple 
considerations about prejudgment interest, or both. Under Braun, the district court's 
statement that "the amount is fine" does not constitute an order of any sort and is not 
appealable. Only the district court's enforcement of the stipulation to withdraw may be 
appealable, and the scope of that stipulation is not shown by the court's ambiguous 
remark (which was only one statement among many on the interrelated subjects discussed 
at the time).23 
The only thing that the stipulated withdrawal accomplished was to concede that 
prejudgment interest was to be calculated by Judge Himonas if the jury awarded property 
damages. Nothing less, nothing more. 
Finally, any error in enforcing the stipulation was occasioned by the Fullers' 
express agreement to withdraw Jury Instruction No. 29 without clarifying the scope of its 
agreement. It is undisputed that the subsequent determination of the date of accrual was 
left to the judge, and the Fullers should not now be allowed to reimagine the discussions 
to suggest that nothing was left to be determined. "[A] party cannot take advantage of an 
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." 
23 R. 1973:68-74. 
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Braun at ,115, quoting Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ,I 17, 164 P.3d 366. Any ambiguity in 
the scope of the parties' stipulation should bear on the party seeking relief-the Fullers. 
Any error regarding the scope of the stipulation was invited by the Fullers and this 
Court should therefore affirm the district court's appropriately discretionary decision 
concerning the scope of such stipulation. 
E. The Fullers' Accusation of a "Bait and Switch" is a Baseless Tactic Not 
Permitted by the U.R.A.P. and Should Be Struck From the Appeal 
and/or Disregarded. 
The Fullers inappropriately accuse Western States of a "bait and switch approach" 
regarding the withdrawal of Jury Instruction No. 29. Appts. Brief at 24, n.4; 49 ( calling it 
a "litigation tactic" and "legal maneuvering.") This desperate approach asserting that 
Western States engaged in a deliberate, preconceived strategy is wholly without merit 
and should be stricken from the record. Should the Court entertain such a statement, it 
amounts to a claim of fraudulent inducement.24 Western States categorically denies 
making any false statement about the stipulation to withdraw, about the interest rate, or 
about any other issue in this case. The record does not reflect any false representations 
and shows that that no inducement was intended nor was one suffered. 
24 See, e.g., Daines v. Vincent, 190 P.3d 1269, 2008 UT 51,,I 38 (stating that a claim of 
fraudulent inducement requires "clear and convincing evidence" establishing eight 
elements "with particularity," including but not limited to evidence of a knowing ( or 
reckless) false representation regarding a "presently existing material fact" that was made 
while "knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a 
representation.") In addition to not making a false statement of fact with knowledge, the 
Fullers knew far more of the existing facts that they intended to present than did W estem 
States. 
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Further, any such insinuations would equally apply to the district court, which 
made considerable efforts to repeatedly review the record in fairness to both parties and 
shared Western States' view that the rate of interest was not stipulated. The Fullers were 
as aware of the facts and law related to their claims as anyone involved in this matter. 
Unless the Fullers suggest that Western States' good faith efforts, representations, and 
arguments were part of some grander conspiracy with the district court to deprive the 
Fullers of prejudgment interest, the Fullers' insinuations amount to sour grapes at best, 
and scandalous at worst. 25 As in Peters, in support of these allegations Fullers' counsel 
offers nothing beyond the fact that the errors were made. Western States respectfully 
suggests that this Court strike such defamatory and offensive statements from the record. 
25 See, e.g. Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n, 2007 UT 2, ,I,I 7-10, 151 P.3d 962 
(striking appellants' briefs which made unfounded accusations about motive rather than 
mere error as scandalous and imposing sanctions and attorneys' fees on appellant's 
counsel) ("[Appellant's] counsel was fully entitled to note the factual error made by the 
court of appeals .... Indeed, it was his obligation as an advocate to do so. So, too, was it 
fully appropriate for counsel to assert that the court of appeals had incorrectly interpreted 
[a] case .... [A]ddress[ing] errors of fact and law is the very purpose of the appellate 
process .... [But] [t]here is a light year's difference between an innocent mistake of fact or 
law and the intentional fabrication of evidence or the intentional misstatement of a 
holding ... Counsel's unfounded accusations ... are scandalous in that they are defamatory 
and offensive to propriety .... [Counsel has claimed] that these errors were intentional and 
the result of improper motives. In support of these accusations, counsel offers nothing 
beyond the fact that the errors were made.") 
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F. Western States Preserved Its Arguments About the Applicable Interest 
Rate and the District Court's Decision Was Within Its Discretion. 
Western States appropriately preserved its arguments about the scope of the 
stipulation to withdraw Jury Instruction No. 29, and is therefore not estopped from 
addressing the applicable interest rate. 
The Fullers misunderstand and/or misapply controlling case law addressing 
stipulations. Even though "when a court adopts a stipulation of the parties, the issues to 
which the parties have stipulated become 'settled' and 'not reserved for future 
consideration, "'26 the stipulation analysis here is not complete, because the scope of the 
stipulation itself is at issue. 
The circumstances here limit the scope of the stipulation, which necessarily affects 
whether or not the district court acted within its discretion when enforcing the stipulation. 
In the cases cited by the Fullers, stipulations were negotiated at length and placed in 
writing by the parties as to specific facts. Most critical to the Court's analysis, the 
Prinsburg court declined to address his claims because "he failed to preserve these issues 
for appeal when it stipulated to their resolution and did not subsequently ask the district 
court to limit or modify the judgment resulting therefrom." Prinsburg at 112 ( citation 
omitted). 
26 Prinsburg at 114, citing Amoss v. Bennion, 517 P .2d 1008, 1009-10 (Utah 1973); see 
also Redev. Agency v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (Utah 1987) (concluding that 
the parties' stipulations precluded "future determination" of the issues contained therein). 
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Here, not only was the stipulation to withdraw done orally, it also undisputedly 
left some determinations to the court: Western States expressly asked the district court to 
limit or modify the judgment requested by the Fullers, and made that request based on the 
disputed scope of the stipulation. R.1799-1811. When Fullers moved for an award of 
10% interest on the full judgment, Western States objected to the amount, the date for 
commencing interest, and the interest rate. 27 A court may exercise its discretion to set 
aside a stipulation under certain conditions. Prinsburg at if 14, quoting Yeargin, Inc. v. 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Com'n, 2001 UT 11, ,r21, 20 P.3d 287. The party seeking 
relief must request it from the court by a timely filed motion and show that it should be 
set aside for justifiable cause. 
That is exactly what Western States' objection to the Fullers' motion for 
prejudgment interest at I 0% served to do. It did not request relief from a stipulation of 
agreed scope; it questioned the scope of the stipulation. 28 
27 Western States also contested whether the award of interest was conceded. Upon 
review of the record by the district court, Western States abandoned that argument and 
does not raise it here. 
28 Prinsburg also notes that stipulations signed by counsel and fled for the court are rarely 
if ever inadvertent. Id., at if 14. In this case, the agreement was oral and under the pressure 
of trial. The parties also agree that enforcement of a stipulation is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Prinsburg, at ,r10 and n.8. A decision within the discretion of the district court 
will only be reversed "if there is no reasonable basis for that decision." Johnston v. Labor 
Comm 'n, 307 P.3d 615, 620 (stating the trial court standards for abuse of discretion and 
applying them to administrative proceedings). If a reasonable basis is apparent from the 
record, the decision will stand. Id. " ... [T]he trial court may properly refuse to give 
requested instructions where it does not accurately reflect the law governing the factual 
situation of the case." Miller v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 2012 UT 54, ,Il3, 285 P.3d 1208. 
In addition, a district court is effectively required to address an error of law brought to its 
attention, as legal error is reversible error. See Wilson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 2012 UT 
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Western States therefore preserved its arguments as to the scope of the oral 
stipulation and, under Prinsburg, the stipulation to withdraw Jury Instruction No. 29 did 
not preclude further discussion of prejudgment interest. The district court's decision to 
revisit the interest rate was appropriate because Western States expressly brought the 
scope of the stipulation to its attention. Western States' objection to the Motion for 
Judgment did not seek relief from a stipulation; it showed that the oral stipulation was 
ambiguous (and/or based upon a mutual mistake).29 Accordingly, Western States 
preserved those questions, and the Fullers' request to es top Western States from re-
asserting its preserved arguments should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Western States respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district court's 
decision to award prejudgment interest at the post-judgment interest rate set by § 15-1-4 
as within its discretion and decide that any other bases for reversal are without merit. 
In addition, the Court should award Western States' costs and reasonable attorney 
fees related to defending this appeal because it was the prevailing party on the issue of 
the appropriate interest rate in the court below. 
43, 1 52 n.15, 289 P .3d 369 ("A trial court abuses its discretion if it commits legal 
error.") 
29 This was not some ploy by Western States to lay an elaborate trap for the Fullers. To 
the contrary, both parties and the court were silent about the date of commencement, as 
well as about the interest rate. It is inarguable that failure to bring up the date of accrual 
was not a stipulation to a particular date. It was simply left for later determination by the 
district court based on the evidence and arguments of the parties. The same applies to the 
applicable interest rate. 
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and 
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge. 
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The case is therefore 
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and I 0th Cir. R. 32.1. 
Bruce S. Gillis, trustee for the Bruce S. Gillis MD MPH Inc. Pension Trust and 
the Cloud Nine Aviation LLC Retirement Trust (Trusts); appeals from district court 
orders granting summary judgment and awarding prejudgment interest to Robert G. 
Wing, Receiver for VesCor Capital Corporation (Receiver). Exercising jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
Val Southwick operated VesCor and a complex network of corporations and 
limited liability companies as a Ponzi scheme.2 Together, the Trusts, who were some 
of the earlier investors in VesCor, purchased over $2.5 million worth of securities 
from VesCor and received, over time, a return from VesCor of more than $582,000 
on their investments. In August 2006, Dr. Gillis sold the MPH Pension Trust's 
interest in a VesCor project to Steven Shapiro for $1.24 million (Shapiro 
Transaction). Three months later, Mr. Shapiro sued Dr. Gillis and the Trusts and 
Mr. Southwick in Nevada state court. In 2011, Mr. Shapiro and Dr. Gillis and the 
Trusts entered into a settlement, extinguishing all claims Mr. Shapiro had against 
Dr. Gillis and the Trusts. 
Upon stipulation of the parties, the district court dismissed Dr. Gillis, 
individually, from the litigation. 
2 
"A Ponzi scheme is a fraudulent investment scheme in which 'profits' to 
investors are not created by the success of the underlying business venture but 
instead are derived fraudulently from the capital contributions of other investors." 
Sender v. Buchanan (In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., Inc.), 84 F.3d 1281, 1282 n.1 
(10th Cir. 1996). 
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• 
In the meantime, on February 6, 2008, the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) filed suit against Mr. Southwick and VesCor alleging 
violations of securities laws. 3 On May 5, the district court appointed the Receiver for 
VesCor. The Receiver filed many lawsuits against VesCor investors to recover 
fraudulent transfers in order to distribute money to later investors. He filed this suit 
on April 9, 2009, asserting a claim for fraudulent transfers based on payments by 
V esCor to the Trusts in excess of the amounts invested by them. 
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court 
granted the Receiver's motion and denied the Trusts' motion. After noting that the 
Trusts did not challenge the Receiver's assertion that VesCor operated as a Ponzi 
scheme, the court decided that "the investment returns VesCor paid to the Trusts 
were fraudulent transfers" and thus the amounts received by the Trusts exceeding 
their investments must be returned. Aplt. App. at 70. Also, the court decided as a 
matter of law that it had jurisdiction over the Trusts' property located in California, 
that California law did not exempt the property from execution, and that the Trusts 
should be treated the same as other VesCor investors. Lastly, the court decided that 
MPH Pension Trust was not entitled to offset its liability to the receivership by the 
amount paid by Mr. Shapiro. The court's judgment ordered the Trusts to return the 
3 On March 31, 2008, in a separate action in Utah state court, Mr. Southwick 
pleaded guilty to several counts of securities fraud and was sentenced to prison. 
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amounts they made to the receivership estate. MPH Pension Trust was ordered to 
return $1,788,667.66, and Cloud Nine Trust was ordered to return $33,939.94. 
After judgment was entered, the Receiver moved to amend the judgment to 
include prejudgment interest. The court awarded interest at 5% beginning 
February 6, 2008, the date the SEC filed its underlying lawsuit against VesCor. The 
court modified its judgment against MPH Pension Trust to $2,330,105.88 and against 
Cloud Nine Trust to $44,213.72. The Trusts appeal both the grant of summary 
judgment and the award of prejudgment interest. 
ANALYSIS 
I 
We review the district court's summary judgment order de novo, and in doing 
so, we apply the same standard used by the district court. Llewellyn v. Allstate Home 
Loans, Inc., 711 F .3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2013 ). Summary judgment is appropriate 
"if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
A 
The Trusts admit that legal authority supports the district court's decision to 
treat them like other investors and to require them to return the amounts they 
received in excess of their investment. See Donel! v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 770 
(9th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he general rule is that to the extent innocent investors have 
received payments in excess of the amounts of principal that they originally invested, 
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those payments are avoidable as fraudulent transfers."); Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 
750, 757-58 (7th Cir. 1995) (same). But they present various arguments in an 
attempt to distinguish themselves from other investors. They argue that the district 
court erred in not estopping the Receiver from abrogating an October 2004 agreement 
between VesCor and the Utah Division of Securities requiring VesCor to repay 
principal and interest to all investors, including the Trusts. The Trusts maintain that 
there is no authority requiring early investors, such as themselves, to return money to 
a receiver for distribution to later investors when the government did not adequately 
supervise the conduct of the organization engaged in the Ponzi scheme. 
Additionally, the Trusts assert that the equities balance in their favor, because the 
creditors represented by the Receiver knew at least as much about VesCor as the 
Trusts' beneficiaries knew and because the Trusts paid monies to retiree beneficiaries 
and any recovery by the Receiver will harm other beneficiaries who are counting on 
current Trust assets to fund their retirements. 
"It is generally recognized that the district court has broad powers and wide 
discretion to determine relief in an equity receivership." SEC v. VesCor Capital 
Corp., 599 F .3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis 
omitted). "The basis for broad deference to the district court's supervisory role in 
equity receiverships arises out of the fact that most receiverships involve multiple 
parties and complex transactions," and "a primary purpose of equity receiverships is 
to promote orderly and efficient administration of the estate by the district court for 
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the benefit of the creditors." SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 1986). 
The district court, however, abuses its discretion and is not entitled to deference 
when its decision is "arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable." 
Estate of Bishop v. Equinox Int 'l Corp., 256 F.3d I 050, 1055 (I 0th Cir. 200 I) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Upon consideration of the Trusts' arguments, we conclude that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in treating the Trusts the same as other VesCor 
investors. Other investors were covered by the 2004 agreement between VesCor and 
the Utah Division of Securities, and there is no indication that those investors were 
treated differently than the district court treated the Trusts. Cf VesCor Capital, 
599 F.3d at 1194 (noting district court seeks to equitably distribute assets). 
Furthermore, there is no indication apart from the Trust's conclusory assertion that 
the Utah Division of Securities failed to properly supervise VesCor. Nor is there any 
indication what other investors knew about the VesCor Ponzi scheme. While retirees 
covered under the Trusts may be adversely affected, we have recognized that not 
everyone will like an equitable plan. See VesCor Capital, 599 F.3d at 1195; see also 
Donel!, 533 F.3d at 776 ("We are aware that it may create a significant hardship 
when an innocent investor ... is informed that he must disgorge profits he earned 
innocently, often years after the money has been received and spent."). 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly decided that the 
monies given to the Trusts in excess of their original investments were fraudulent 
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transfers, and the differences between the original investments and the amounts 
received must be returned. See Donel!, 533 F.3d at 772 (requiring investors to return 
fictitious profits as fraudulent transfers, when investor receives more than amount 
invested); Scholes, 56 F.3d at 757-58 (reaching similar decision in Ponzi case). 
B 
Next, the Trusts argue that the district court erred by including the Shapiro 
Transaction in its calculation of damages. According to the Trusts, the $1.24 million 
the MPH Pension Trust received when it sold part of its interests in VesCor to 
Mr. Shapiro should not be part of the Receiver's calculations because Mr. Shapiro 
filed a lawsuit against the Trust and Dr. Gillis to recover that money. Since that case 
settled, the Trust contends that the Receiver has no standing to raise the issue for 
Mr. Shapiro and the $1.24 million should not be part of the damages calculation. 4 
4 The terms of the settlement are not disclosed. At a hearing on the 
summary-judgment motion, the Trusts' counsel stated that "money has been paid by 
the pensions to Steven Shapiro to satisfy claims that were brought in" the Nevada 
court. Aplt. App. at 46. The Trusts' counsel later admitted he did not know the exact 
amount agreed upon to settle the Nevada lawsuit, but he knew it was not $1.24 
million. Id. at 48. Also, the Receiver's counsel was unaware of the dollar amount 
paid back to Mr. Shapiro, but counsel understood that the amount was "de minimis." 
Id. at 49. On appeal, the Receiver indicates that he "is willing to decrease the amount 
of the receivership's recovery against the Trusts by the amount actually returned to 
Mr. Shapiro" as part of the settlement. Aplee. Br. at 12; see Aplt. App. at 49 
(indicating that if Trusts paid back money to Mr. Shapiro, Receiver would give offset 
to Trusts and decrease claim Mr. Shapiro has against receivership). But "the Trusts 
did not disclose [in the district court] the amount of the settlement, and have not 
given the Receiver that information since then." Aplee. Br. at 12. Nor was the 
amount disclosed in the Trusts' appellate briefs. 
( continued) 
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Even without the settlement, the Trusts argue that the Shapiro Transaction is not part 
of this case because it would be subject to double liability through Mr. Shapiro's 
Nevada lawsuit and this lawsuit. 
In considering the Shapiro Transaction, the district court determined as 
follows: 
MPH ... reduced the amount of its investment when it assigned part of 
its investment to Mr. Shapiro in exchange for a payment of 
$1,240,000.00. This assignment to Shapiro reduced the amount of 
MPH' s investment, and consequently reduces the amount by which 
MPH can be deemed to have given reasonable equivalent value in 
exchange for the payments received. After assigning the claim to 
Shapiro, MPH's investment in VesCor (and therefore its offset) is 
reduced .... 
Aplt. App. at 74. In effect, the court treated the $1.24 million as a payment in excess 
of the Trusts' investment. 
We cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion. When MPH 
Pension Trust transferred ownership in part of its investment to Mr. Shapiro, it no 
longer had the investment and could not use it as an offset against the Receiver's 
fraudulent transfer claim. Thus, the $1.24 million effectively was a return on the 
Trust's original investment, and the district court properly required MPH Pension 
Trust to return to VesCor the $1.24 million the MPH Pension Trust received from 
Mr. Shapiro. 
The parties dispute whether Dr. Gillis was aware of the Ponzi scheme at the 
time he sold interests in VesCor to Mr. Shapiro. See Aplt. App. at 46. The Trusts' 
counsel indicated that Mr. Southwick entered into a separate transaction with 





The Trusts argue that the district court erred in finding that their assets were 
not exempt under Cal. C.C.P. 704.115(b), which provides that assets of qualified 
retirement plans are exempt from creditors. 5 Like the district court, we disagree with 
the Trusts' interpretation of this statute. When, as is true here, claims are against the 
Trusts themselves, not the Trusts' beneficiaries, the statute does not exempt the 
Trusts' assets from the Receiver's claims. See In re Rucker (Cunning v. Rucker), 
570 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that "purpose of[§ 704.11 S(b )] 
exemption is to permit a judgment debtor to place funds beyond the reach of 
creditors, so long as they qualify for the exemption under the law" (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Thus, the district court did not err in refusing to exempt the Trusts' 
assets from the Receiver's fraudulent transfer claim. 
D 
Next, the Trusts argue that the district court erred in deciding the Receiver had 
jurisdiction over their assets located in California. As is required by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 754, 6 the Receiver filed copies of the complaint and the order of appointment of a 
5 Section 704.11 S(b) provides that"[ a]ll amounts held, controlled, or in process 
of distribution by a private retirement plan, for the payment of benefits as an annuity, 
pension, retirement allowance, disability payment, or death benefit from a private 
retirement plan are exempt." 
6 Section 754 provides: 
A receiver appointed in any civil action or proceeding involving 
property, real, personal or mixed, situated in different districts shall ... 
( continued) 
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receiver in the proper California federal district court in order to obtain jurisdiction 
over the California assets. The Trusts contend, however, that because the California 
case was closed in March 20 I 0, there is no pending California case or controversy 
giving the Receiver jurisdiction over the assets. But § 754 does not require a case to 
be pending in California; it requires only that the complaint and order of appointment 
be filed in the California court in order for the Utah court to exercise jurisdiction 
over the assets located in California. Thus, we conclude the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in deciding it has jurisdiction over the California assets. 
II 
The Trusts argue that the district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest 
because the court made no finding that the Trusts engaged in misconduct. Also, they 
argue that the court erred in awarding prejudgment interest because VesCor made 
payments to the Trusts at the direction of the Utah Division of Securities, which 
allegedly failed to supervise VesCor's and Mr. Southwick's activities as they 
continued to engage in fraudulent activity. Even if the court properly awarded 
be vested with complete jurisdiction and control of all such property 
with the right to take possession thereof. 
Such receiver shall, within ten days after the entry of his order of 
appointment, file copies of the complaint and such order of appointment 
in the district court for each district in which property is located. The 
failure to file such copies in any district shall divest the receiver of 
jurisdiction and control over all such property in that district. 
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prejudgment interest, the Trusts contend that the court erred in awarding interest at a 
rate of 5%, rather than at the post-judgment interest rate set by 28 U.S.C. § 1961. 
Finally, the Trusts argue that any award of interest should accrue from April 9, 2009, 
the date the Receiver filed this lawsuit, not from February 6, 2008, the date the SEC 
filed its underlying lawsuit against VesCor. 
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
prejudgment interest. Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Ground Improvement Techniques, 
Inc., 532 F.3d 1063, 1073 (10th Cir. 2008) ("An award of prejudgment interest is 
within the district court's discretion." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Without 
the award, the Trusts effectively would have benefited from an interest-free loan of 
the amount in excess of their investments. See William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 
646 F.3d 138, 145 (3d Cir. 2011) ("Requiring only that a losing defendant pay back 
the principle amount of a wrongfully obtained sum permits him to retain the money's 
time value as a windfall in the form of an interest-free loan."). In other words, the 
award of prejudgment interest compensates for the loss of use of the money. See 
Donel!, 533 F.3d at 772; Morrison Knudsen, 532 F.3d at 1073. Under fairness and 
equity principles, prejudgment interest was proper. See Morrison Knudsen, 532 F.3d 
at 1075. 
Having decided that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
prejudgment interest, we next consider whether the court abused its discretion in 
selecting a 5% rate of interest. See SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 
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14 76 (2d Cir. 1996) (reviewing rate of interest for abuse of discretion). The parties 
concede that there is no federal statute setting forth an appropriate rate of 
prejudgment interest. Although the Trusts assert that § 1961 provides the appropriate 
rate, § 1961 "applies to post-judgment interest, and the district court was not bound 
by its strictures. Many circuits have held that courts are not required to use section 
1961 in calculating prejudgment interest and that the calculation rests firmly within 
the sound discretion of the trial court." Caldwell v. Life Ins. Co. of N Am., 287 F.3d 
1276, 1287 (10th Cir. 2002). In this case, the district court chose an interest rate that 
was mid-way between the interest rates proposed by the parties. Under the 
circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in selecting 
a 5% rate of interest. 
Lastly, the Trusts also challenge the district court's decision to award 
prejudgment interest from the date the SEC filed suit against Mr. Southwick and 
VesCor instead of from the date the Receiver filed this lawsuit. The court could have 
selected that date, or the court could have awarded prejudgment interest from an 
earlier date when a transfer was made, see, e.g., Donel!, 533 F.3d at 772. Instead, 
the court picked a date in the middle of those dates. We defer to the district court's 
determination and conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in choosing the date 
the SEC filed suit against VesCor and Mr. Southwick. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 7 
Entered for the Court 
John C. Porfilio 
Senior Circuit Judge 
7 We remind the Receiver of his duty to cite to the district court record. See 
Fed. R. App. P. 28(b) (referring to Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A)), which requires 
citations to parts of record relied upon). 
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